2014.07.06【英译汉】Ukraine and Russia乌克兰和俄罗斯 War by any other name(二)

ydyinglluk (Erin) 译坛新秀
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发表于:2014-07-06 12:24 [只看楼主] [划词开启]

For his part, Mr Putin appears, at least for now, to have ruled out a full-frontal invasion. On June 24th he theatrically instructed the ever-loyal upper house of parliament to cancel the authorisation for military force inUkrainethat he had ordered up in early March. The move was largely an empty fob to Mr Poroshenko and another way to ward off more Western sanctions. Yet even if a tanks-and-soldiers invasion seems unlikely, a Russian invasion of another sort began long ago: one that resembles the slippery, post-modern war described by Mr Surkov.


The nature of the incursion speaks volumes for the reach of the Russian state under Mr Putin. Today’sRussiathinks of itself as a mobilisation state, ready to deploy a full array of instruments in a crisis. In Ukrainethis means a policy that combines covert arms transfers, volunteer fighters called up by patriotic organisations, oligarchs and others, propaganda produced by state-run media, punitive arm-twisting over gas prices and a worsening of political repression at home. Officials inMoscow, who have taken to praising non-linear war even if they do not use the precise term, say they are wielding the same tools the Americans use all the time: first engineer protests, and if that doesn’t work, back them up by force.


The advantage of such an approach is “plausible deniability,” explains Dmitry Gorenburg of CNA Corporation, a policy and security think-tank. Above all, it helpsRussiato avoid a new round of American and European sanctions, which would aim not just at individuals but at entire industries. Existing sanctions and the fears of more to come have already had a “chilling effect” on investment, according to the IMF, which now says that Russian GDP growth will be zero this year. The murkiness and obfuscation of Mr Putin’s non-linear war inUkrainealso complicate Western diplomacy, dividing opinion and making it harder to find consensus.


What Mr Putin would really like is a conflict of just the right size: big enough to force Mr Poroshenko into concessions but not so large it dragsRussiain directly or forces it to subsidiseUkraine’s eastern regions. As Mr Gorenburg explains, Mr Putin will facilitate the transfer of Russian arms, fighters and money so as to ensure that “the insurgency isn’t defeated, but while doing the minimum possible”.


Mr Putin’s apparent interest in an on-again, off-again cycle of ceasefires and negotiations suggests that he would like to lock the conflict in place, legitimising the so-called people’s republics inDonetskand Luhansk and raising the profile of these rebel commanders ready to take orders fromMoscow. Such a war—oscillating between open fighting and political talks, but without ever being completely resolved—would resemble other frozen conflicts around the formerSovietUnion. In Abkhazia,South Ossetiaand Transdniestria, unsettled but largely bloodless conflicts serve to constrain the Georgian and Moldovan governments as well as providing a built-in lever for Russian meddling.


最后编辑于:2014-07-06 22:27
分类: 英语
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