2014.05.27【英译汉】A question of trust(3/3)

heyjude1943 (兔纸) 初涉译坛
156 10 0
发表于:2014-05-27 23:15 [只看楼主] [划词开启]

2014.05.26【英译汉】A question of trust(2/3)


The Armageddon scenario
Some observers have concluded from all this that China is on the verge of a “Lehman moment”. Increases in a country’s debt on the scale of China’s have almost always ended in a financial crisis of some sort. A series of defaults in the trust sector, the theory runs, will cause investors to lose faith in high-yield investment products. That, in turn, will cause short-term lending to dry up, leaving mid-sized banks with smaller deposit bases struggling to finance themselves and making it impossible to roll over trust loans that fall due this year. More defaults will follow.
末日场景
观 察家们从上述情况得出的结论是,中国处于“雷曼时刻”的边缘。一个国家若增持的债务规模有如中国,那么只会终结于某种形式的金融危机。信托行业的一系列违 规事件,在理论上会导致投资者对高收益的投资产品失去信心。反之,将导致短期贷款干涸,于是存款基础较小的中型银行,融资全靠自己努力,由于今年信托贷款 的一蹶不振而使之无法翻身。更多的违约将接踵而至。

Those who predict such an outcome reckon that China’s trust sector in many respects resembles pre-crisis shadow banking in the West. Much of it looks like a blatant attempt by Chinese banks to get around the restrictions regulators have placed on them. Trust companies are often mere custodians of investment products dreamt up by banks. They raise money by offering more attractive returns than banks and lend to sectors banks are not supposed to. Many of their offerings are designed to mature a day or two before the end of each quarter, so that the money invested in them is returned to customers’ bank accounts just in time to shore up the banks’ loan-to-deposit ratios. Although banks have no formal responsibility if the investments sour, they may end up stepping in to help, as many of their Western counterparts did during the financial crisis.
之所以对中国信托业预测出这样的结果,只因类似情 况与西方影子银行危机非常类似。大部分情况看起来就像中国各大银行公然企图逃避监管机构的限制。信托公司只需要单纯保管投资产品的美梦被银行终结。他们需要通 过提供比银行更具吸引力的回报、贷款给银行部门不可能贷款的公司,以此来募集资金。他们设计的许多产品都是到每个季度结束前一两天才到期,于是投入其中的 资金可以及时返回到客户的银行账户借以支撑银行的贷存比率。如果投资出现问题——就算银行没有正式的责任,最终也可能会插手帮忙,一如金融危机期间 的西方同行们。

More worrying still, until recently there was a dangerous mismatch between the maturities of trust products (often just a couple of months) and the loans underpinning them (often a couple of years). The trust companies got round this by maintaining a pool of loans funded by several trust products. When one of the products matured, they simply raised another one of the same size. Although these arrangements were not quite Ponzi schemes, in that the products were backed by real, revenue-generating assets, they were almost as fragile. Without new deposits rolling in, the system would have collapsed.
更令人担忧的是,直到最近出现的 信托产品的到期日(通常只是一两个月)与支持这些产品的贷款期(通常是一两年)存在着极度危险的不匹配情况。信托公司为避免这一情况,则通过多个信托产品来 维持资金池。当一款产品到期,他们只需再生成一款等额产品即可。虽然这些手段不能算是庞氏骗局,(因为这种理财产品背后是有真金实银做后盾的),但是还是 跟庞氏骗局一样的脆弱。如果没有吸引到新的存款,整个系统就会崩溃。

But Chinese financial regulators, like their colleagues in the West, have learned some lessons from the events of 2007-08. Last year they banned the pooling trick, requiring each trust product to be tied to a discrete set of loans. They have also restricted banks’ off-balance-sheet activities, often disguised as trusts, which they can do fairly easily because they regulate trust firms directly. That has helped them to maintain lending standards: most trust loans are backed by high levels of collateral and barred from borrowing to leverage their investments. Another rule limits to 35% the share of the money raised by trusts that can be lent out, as opposed to invested in stocks and bonds. And only the rich are allowed to invest in trust products.
不过中国的金融监管机构——与西方的同行们一样,已经从07-08年的事件中学到一些经 验教训。去年他们禁止了资金池花招,要求每个信托产品必须捆绑一组独立贷款。他们还限制银行的非资产负债表活动——这种手段往往伪装成信托产品,银行做起 来相当容易,因为它们可以直接管理信托公司。这么做有助于他们维持贷款标准:多数信托贷款是由高水平的抵押品为支持;禁止投资杠杆。还有一条规则限制:信托 募集的资金最多只可借出35%,不可投资于股票和债券。而且只有富人才能允许投资信托产品。

The main reason why a calamitous run on Chinese shadow banks is unlikely, however, is that the country has the capacity to absorb lots of non-performing loans. Its debts, both shadowy and well-lit, are much smaller relative to GDP than they were in most Western countries before the crisis struck. More important, China’s central government and the big state-owned banks are still in rude financial health and could intervene to buy up troubled assets, preventing the credit market from seizing up. Currency controls would stop panicked Chinese from spiriting their money out of the country.
中国的影子银行不大可能遭遇崩溃的一个主要原因就是这个国家具有吸收大量不良贷款的能力。其债务,不管是在明处还是暗处,相对于 GDP而言远远小于危机前的大多数西方国家。更重要的是,中央政府和大型国有银行仍然粗放的管理财务状况,而且可能通过购买不良资产进行干预,防止信贷市 场失灵。货币控制将阻止恐慌的中国人把他们的钱转移到国外去。

The fate of China Credit Equals Gold, the troubled trust product based on loans to Zhenfu Energy, is instructive. Days before the threatened default a mystery buyer suddenly appeared and acquired some of Zhenfu Energy’s assets. That allowed all the principal to be repaid; in the end, investors lost only a portion of their last interest payment. Although the details remain opaque, most observers assume that China Credit Trust, ICBC and the provincial and central governments worked together to avoid a more destabilising outcome. The authorities and their agents could afford to repeat that on a much grander scale.
中诚等价黄金的命运则很有教育意义。(中诚等价黄金是基于振富能源的贷款的一个出问题的信托产品) 在违约之前的几天,突然出现一个神秘买家,且拥有振富能源的部分资产。这个情况使得投资人的本金能够得到偿还;最终投资者只损失了最后一期利息的一小部 分。虽然细节并不透明,众多观察家认为这是中诚信托、中国工商银行与省及中央政府共同合作的结果,用以避免更多的不稳定后果。当局与其代理人想必有能力对 付更大规模的信贷危机。◆


(全文字数:3000+)

最后编辑于:2014-10-30 16:08
分类: 英语
全部回复 (10) 回复 反向排序

  • 0

    点赞

  • 收藏

  • 扫一扫分享朋友圈

    二维码

  • 分享

课程推荐

需要先加入社团哦

编辑标签

最多可添加10个标签,不同标签用英文逗号分开

保存

编辑官方标签

最多可添加10个官方标签,不同标签用英文逗号分开

保存
知道了

复制到我的社团